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A COMPARISON OF THE USE OF CHARACTER WITNESS TESTIMONY IN MARYlAND VERSUS THE FEDERAL PRACTICE: DISTINGUISHING REASONABLE BASIS FROM SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF
CONDUCT AFTER JENSEN V. STATE, 355 MD. 692, 736 A.2D
307 (1999)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental rule of character evidence is the "propensity
rule," establishing a general prohibition against the use of character
evidence to prove that a person acted in conformity with a specific
character trait on a particular occasion. l When a witness testifies at
trial, the credibility of that witness automatically becomes relevant, directly impinging on the propensity rule by raising the question
whether that person testified in conformity with the character trait for
truthfulness. 2 Accordingly, Federal Rule of Evidence 608 ("Rule
608")3 and Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-608 ("Maryland Rule 5-608")4
1. See FED. R. EVlD. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion .... "). Accord MD. R. EVlD. 5404. Character evidence is defined as proof of general moral character or a specific
character trait, such as honesty, carefulness, generosity, violence, sobriety,
or truthfulness and other traits relevant to litigation. See 5 LYNN MCLAIN,
MARYLAND PRACTICE § 404.1, at 338-39 (1987).
2. See JOSEPH F. MuRPHY, MARYlAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 507(B) (3d ed.
1999); EDWARD J. IMWlNKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 108 (3d ed.
1995); James W. McElhaney, An Impeachment Checklist: Attacking the Witness's
Credibility, 78 A.B.A. J. 62 (1992); see also State v. Duke, 123 A.2d 745, 746
(N.H. 1956) ("No sufficient reason appears why the jury should not be informed what sort of person is asking them to take his word. In transactions
of everyday life this is probably the first thing that they would wish to
know.").
3. FED. R. EVID. 608. Federal Rule of Evidence 608, entitled Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness, provides:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility
of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form
of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after
the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by
opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct
of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the wit-
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carve out an exception to the propensity rule. 5
Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608 govern the admissibility of character witness testimony used to impeach or rehabilitate a principal witness's specific trait for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 6 Even though
character evidence may be relevant proof as to whether a principal
ness's credibility ... may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of
the witness (1) concerning the witness's character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
FED. R. EVID. 608.
4. MD. R. EVID. 5-608. Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-608, entitled Evidence of
Character of Witness for Truthfulness or Untruthfulness, provides:
(a) Impeachment and Rehabilitation by Character Witnesses. (1)
Impeachment by a Character Witness. In order to attack the credibility of a witness, a character witness may testify (A) that the witness has a reputation for untruthfulness, or (B) that, in the
character witness's opinion, the witness is an untruthful person.
(2) Rehabilitation by a Character Witness. After the character for
truthfulness of a witness has been attacked, a character witness may
testify (A) that the witness has a good reputation for truthfulness,
or (B) that, in the character witness's opinion, the witness is a
truthful person.
(3) Limitations on Character Witness's Testimony. (A) A character
witness may not testify to an opinion as to whether a witness testified truthfully in the action. (B) On direct examination, a character witness may give a reasonable basis for testimony as to
reputation or an opinion as to the character of the witness for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, but may not testify to specific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness by the witness.
(4) Impeachment of Character Witness. The court may permit a
character witness to be cross-examined about specific instances in
which a witness has been truthful or untruthful ....
Id.
S. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (3); MD. R. EVID. 5-404(a)(I)(C); 3AJOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 920, at 723 (John H.
Chadborn ed., rev. 1970) (Professor Wigmore opined: "that which induces
us to believe that a witness is or is not likely to be speaking truthfully is
usually some circumstance of his actual personality.").
6. A principal witness is defined as "a witness who has given substantive testimony - thus, usually, a witness who has previously testified." LYNN MCLAiN,
MARYlAND RULES OF EVIDENCE § 2.608.3, at 148 (1994). A character witness
is defined as "both the reputation witness who testifies as to the accused
person's community reputation and the opinion witness who testifies that
in his opinion the accused possesses certain character traits." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1604 (6th ed. 1990).
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witness is credible, extreme caution is required when admitting such
given the dangers. 7
Consequently, evidentiary rules operate to limit the use of evidence
that can obstruct the truth. s Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608 contain various safeguards to limit the occurrences of the underlying dangers to character evidence. 9 It is undisputed that a character witness is
strictly prohibited from testifying about specific acts of the principal
witness's conduct on direct examination. Io Due to the Court of Appeals of Maryland recent holding in Jensen v. State,II however, testimony about specific instances of a principal witness's conduct may be
admissible if disguised as proper "reasonable basis" testimony.I2
The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate that the court of
appeals went too far with its holding in Jensen. No longer is it clear in
Maryland what separates a permissible "reasonable basis" from an impermissible "specific instance of conduct."13 This is especially troublesome because character evidence plays a significant role in the
outcome of a trial,14
7. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 608.02[02] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2000); infra Part
III.A.
8. The Federal Rules of Evidence represent a compromise between supplying
the trier of fact with relevant evidence used to estimate the truth, and excluding otherwise relevant evidence that in the long-term tends to obstruct
the truth. See Federal Rule of Evidence 102 ("[T]hese rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.") (emphasis added). See also Robert D. Okun, Character and Credibility: A Proposal to Realign Federal Rules ofEvidence 608 and 609, 37 VILL. L. REv.
533,534 (1992). Certain rules of evidence prohibit otherwise relevant evidence because of the danger that the admission of the evidence may undermine the truth. Examples of this concept include the rules against hearsay,
the best evidence rule, and in the instant case, the rules against propensity
evidence. See id.
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See infra Part III.B.3.
11. 355 Md. 692, 736 A.2d 307 (1999).
12. See infra Part III.C.2.a.; note 275 and accompanying text.
13. Compare infra Part III.C.2.a. with Part III.C.2.b
14. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 8.3, at
408 (3d ed. 1996); see also Fred Warren Bennett, Is the Witness Believable? A
New Look at Truth and Veracity Character Evidence and Bad Acts Relevant to
Truthfulness in a Criminal Case, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 569, 602 (1997) (recognizing that in a criminal trial the verdict is based on who the jury believes,
therefore, the credibility of witnesses is critical to guilt or innocence);
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Part II of this Comment discusses the evolution of using character
witness testimony from common law to the adoption of Rule 608,15
other jurisdictions' rules on character evidence,I6 and Maryland Rule
5-608. 17 Part III outlines the dangers underlying character evidence
and explains the limitations imposed to restrict the use of character
witness testimony. IS This section focuses on the foundational requirements for admitting character evidence by comparing the federal
practice to the Maryland practice. I9 Part IV describes the difficulty
and importance of distinguishing reasonable basis testimony from specific instances of conduct, and scrutinizes the court's holding in Jensen. 20 Finally, this Comment concludes by recommending that
Maryland adopt a more restrictive approach to the use of character
witness testimony.21
II.

THE HISTORY OF ALLOWING A CHARACTER WITNESS TO
TESTIFY TO THE TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS
OF A PRINCIPAL WITNESS

A.

Proving Character at Common Law: Limiting the Methods of Proof

At common law, a witness's character for truthfulness was always relevant, causing evidence of that trait to be admissible. 22 Prior to the
1700s, a character witness could testify to an opinion of the principal
witness's general character supported by testimony of specific instances of conduct. 23 By the 1800s, a character witness could still testify in the form of an opinion, but was limited to the principal
witness's character for truthfulness, and prohibited from testifYing to
specific instances of conduct. 24
A. MAULT & WARREN D. WOLFSON, TRIAL EVIDENCE § 2.1, at 9
(1997); David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L.
REv. 1155, 1172 (1992).
See infra Part II.A & B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part III.A & B.
See infra Part III.C ..
See infra Part IV.
See infra notes 326-32 and accompanying text.
See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 922, at 726.
Id. § 923, at 728.
Id. The past use of general character testimony influenced the form of inquiry. The question asked was "knowing [the principal witness's] general
character, would you believe him under oath?" Id. The character witness
was limited to testifying about veracity, but could base an opinion on knowledge of the principal witness's general character. See id.

THOMAS

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
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Over time, character evidence was further limited by prohibiting
the use of opinion testimony, but permitting the use of reputation
testimony about the principal witness's character for truthfulness. 25
Opinion testimony was prohibited based on the fear that it generated
extraneous issues about specific conduct of the principal witness. 26
This common-law practice was the backdrop for the codification of
formal rules of evidence, and still provides a source of guidance for
identifying problems and suggesting solutions to evidentiary issues. 27

B.

Adopting Rule 608: Permitting Opinion and Reputation Testimony

There was some debate over whether to adopt formal rules of evidence. Proponents of codification found utility in formal rules to improve the quality of judges and attorneys,28 to promote uniformity
and predictability in the application of evidentiary rules,29 and to increase the amount of admissible evidence based on a case-by-case exercise of judicial discretion leading to better admissibility
determinations. 30 Conversely, opponents disregarded the "quality of
judges and attorneys" argument,31 found error in the reasoning that
uniformity and predictability could be achieved through formal
rules,32 and proffered that increased admissibility and enhanced judi25. Id. § 922, at 726.
26. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 43, at 156-57 Gohn William Strong et al. eds.,
4th ed. 1992). When a character witness expresses an opinion, side issues
are provoked because the character witness may be cross-examined about
the grounds for the opinion. Id.
27. See Edward W. Cleary, Introduction to FED. R. EVID., at V. (West eds., 1999).
28. See Margaret Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the
Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 255, 258 n.21 (1984) (citing Stephen A Saltzburg, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Continuing Education
ofjudges and Lawyers, 5 VA. L. SCH. REp. 6 (1981) and Stephen A Saltzburg,
The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Quality of Practice in Federal Courts, 27
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 173 (1978».
29. Id. at 259 n.22 (citing Gradl F. Tollison,Jr., A Plea for Adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, 53 MISS. LJ. 49 (1983) and Thomas F. Green, A Preliminary Report on the Admissibility and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of
Evidencefor the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73,109-10 (1962».
30. Id. at 259 n.23 (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE T-2, at iii-iv (1982); Jack B. Weinstein, The Ohio and Federal
Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 517 (1977); Paul F. Rothstein, Some Themes
in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. BJ. 21, 29 (1974».
31. Id. at 259 n.24 (citing John H. Wigmore, The American Law Inst. Code of
Evidence Rules. A Dissent, 28 ABA J. 23, 24 (1942».
32. Id. at 259 n.25 (citingJoHN H. WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1942».
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cial discretion does not lead to better admissibility determinations. 33
Despite such resistance, in 1965, an advisory committee was formed to
draft the Federal Rules of Evidence. 34 What eventually became Rule
608 was the subject of debate among the drafters and Congress concerning the proper balance between the value and dangers of character witness testimony.35 A major issue was the admissibility of opinion
character evidence.
In 1969, the preliminary draft of Rule 608 expressly permitted opinion testimony but excluded reputation testimony.36 This was a complete reversal from the pre-rules practice. 37 In response, the revised
draft permitted both opinion and reputation testimony.38 In addition, a higher level of probative value was required for the admission
of specific instances of conduct evidence on cross-examination. 39 This
change represented a heightened awareness of the prejudicial effect
of admitting specific instances. 4o Finally, greater restrictions were
placed on the admissibility of character evidence by requiring that evidence be" 'clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and not
remote in time."'41
The Department of Justice (DOJ) responded to the Revised Draft
by protesting that the heightened standard for admissibility of character evidence was too demanding. 42 The DOJ also opposed the admissibility of opinion evidence arguing it would cause distracting and
time-consuming direct examinations concerning specific acts that
were the basis for the opinion testimony.43
In consideration of the DOl's concerns, the Judicial Conference
Draft of Rule 608 relaxed the standard of admissibility44 and added a
33. Berger, supra note 28, at 259 n.26 (citing J. Clay Smith, Codification of the
Rules of Evidence: An Unreadiness, 33 FED. BJ. 44 (1974».
34. See Cleary, supra note 27, at III.
35. 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VIGrOR JAMES GoLD, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6111, at 8 (1993).
36. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 260, at 135 (2d ed. 1994) (citing 46 F.R.D. 161,292-95 (1969».
37. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
38. 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6111, at 11-13.
39. 28 id. at 13.
40. 28 id.
41. 28 id. at 14.
42. 28 id. (arguing the "clearly probative ... and not remote in time" requirements were too stringent).
43. 28 id. at 17.
44. 28 id. at 17 (retaining the "and not remote in time" language but deleting
the word "clearly" from the clearly probative standard).
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cross-reference to the Advisory Committee's Note for Rule 405. 45 The
Supreme Court Draft made no changes to the Judicial Conference
Draft. 46 Throughout the drafting process of Rule 608, however, objections were voiced and renewed against the admissibility of opinion
evidence. 47
The Second Committee Print prohibited the use of opinion evidence, and instead favored the common-law practice of permitting
only reputation evidence. 48 This committee action was challenged
during floor debate where an amendment proposing the reinstatement of opinion evidence as a permissible method of proving character was passed. 49 Both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives
agreed to a final draft, and the current version of Rule 608 was enacted in 1975. 50 Subsequently, Rule 608 served as a model for the
codification of state rules of evidence on character witness
testimony.51

45. 28 id. at 18. The Advisory Committee's note explained that opinion testimony regarding a person's character ought to be limited to "the nature and
extent of observation and acquaintance upon which the opinion is based.»
FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note.
46. See 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6111, at 20-21.
47. 28 id.at 18-20. A series of letters were exchanged between the DOJ, the
Attorney General, and the drafters of Rule 608 over the concern of admitting opinion testimony. 28 id. at 18-20 nn.27-29.
48. 28 id. at 24 (acknowledging that the Judiciary Committee concurred in this
action to restrict the method of proof to the common-law practice).
49. See 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6111, at 25 (restoring the language
proposed by the Advisory Committee).
50. 28 id.
51. 28 id. at 27. A general overview of the effects of the codification of the
Federal Rules of Evidence reveals a transformation in the process of evidentiary decision making. See generally Berger, supra note 28.
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Other jurisdictions' Rules on Character Evidena[>2

A majority of jurisdictions followed the federal practice and
adopted Rule 608(a) and (b) verbatim. 53 Some jurisdictions adopted
rules consistent with Rule 608, but made minor changes in word
choice 54 or added provisions to clarify the federal rule. 55
The added provision limited the use of character evidence. 56 For
example, some jurisdictions permitted character evidence only in the
form of reputation testimony, 57 while other jurisdictions expressly and
categorically prohibited the use of specific instances of conduct, even
52. The extent of this particular comparison centered around the text of the
evidentiary rules on character witnesses. No research or analysis was completed as to the judicial application of other jurisdictions' rules. The following acknowledgement is relevant, that "[iJ t is important . . . not to
conclude that similar, or even identical, language will receive the same interpretation in one jurisdiction as it has in another." Alan D. Hornstein,
The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Survey, Analysis and Critique, 54 MD. L.
REv. 1032, 1034 (1995). Other commentators have undertaken an analysis
of state rules of character evidence. See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 36, § 260, at 140 nn.20-23; 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 35,
§ 6111, at 27-28 nn.49-51.
53. ALA. R EVID. 608; ARIZ. R EVID. 608; ARK. R EVID. 608; COLO. R EVID. 608;
IDAHO R EVID. 608; IND. R EVID. 608; IOWA R EVID. 608; MICH. R EVID.
608; MINN. R EVID. 608; MISS. R EVID. 608; NEB. R EVID. 608; N.H. R EVID.
608; N.M. R EVID. 11-608; N.C. R EVIO. 608; N.D. R. EVID. 608; OHIO R
EVID. 608; OKLA. R. EVID. 2608; RI. R EVID. 608; S.D. R EVID. 19-14-9; VT.
R EVIO. 608; W.VA. R EVID. 608; WYO. R EVID. 608.
54. CONN. R EVID. 6-6; HAw. R EVID. 608; MONT. R EVID. 608; WIS. R EVID.
906.08.
55. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
56. ALA. R EVID. 608 (adding subsection (c) that requires judicial balancing of
probative value and prejudicial effect before allowing specific instances of
conduct on cross examination); Ky. R EVID. 608 (permitting opinion and
reputation testimony limited to general reputation, but no mention of specific instances of conduct); NEV. REv. STAT. 50.085 (1996) (permitting opinion testimony but prohibiting reputation testimony); S.C. R EVID. 608
(adding subsection (c) that permits evidence of bias to impeach witness);
TENN. R EVID. 608 (adding subsections that require judicial determination
of probative value and reasonable basis before inquiry of specific instances
of conduct on cross examination); UTAH R EVID. 608 (adding subsection
(c) that permits evidence of bias or prejudice to impeach witness).
57. DEL. R EVID. 608; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.609 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-9-84 (1995); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 608 (West 1995); ME. R EVID.
608; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 21A (West 2000); PA. R EVID. 608;
WASH. R EVID. 608.
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if on cross-examination and probative of truthfulness. 58 In the later
instance, by disallowing specific instances of conduct, these jurisdictions alleviated some of the dangers that accompany proof of
character. 59

D.

Maryland Rule 5-608: An Adaptation of Federal Rule 608

In Maryland, prior to the adoption of formal rules, the body of evidence law was contained in the Maryland Reports and Maryland
Code. 60 The scope and use of character witnesses were governed by
Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, section 9115. 61 Shortly after section 9-115 was enacted, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland commented that section 9-115 "made a drastic change in
the substantive law" by abrogating the common law to allow both personal opinion and reputation evidence,62 and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland interpreted section 9-115 as "the common law rule
with a vastly broadened field of vision."63
In 1977, Maryland began the process of adopting formal rules of
evidence modeled after the Federal Rules. 64 This attempt was rejected by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, who opted to allow more
time for the newly codified Federal Rules of Evidence to settle. 65
While waiting for the Federal Rules to settle, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland held in Hemingway v. State,66 that a character witness should be permitted to give an opinion of a principal witness's
violent character and the basis for that opinion, even if the testimony
constitutes a specific instance of conduct. 67 This holding was significant as it departed from the Federal Rules, common law, and statutory
58. CAL. EVlD. CODE §§ 786-87 (West 1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 608 (West 1994);
OR. EVlD. CODE 608; TEX. R. EVlD. 608.
59. See infra Part II.A.; note 125 and accompanying test.
60. See Hornstein, supra note 52, at 1034.
61. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-115 (1974). This section stated:
Where character evidence is otheIWise relevant to the proceeding,
no person offered as a character witness who has an adequate basis
for forming an opinion as to another person's character shall hereafter be excluded from giving evidence based on personal opinion
to prove character, either in person or by deposition, in any suit,
action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in any court or before any
judge, or jury of the State.
[d.
62. Taylor v. State, 278 Md. 150, 155,360 A.2d 430, 433-34 (1976).
63. Nishchuk v. State, 32 Md. App. 403, 407, 362 A.2d 91,94 (1976).
64. Hornstein, supra note 52, at 1033.
65. See id.
66. 76 Md. App. 127,543 A.2d 879 (1988).
67. [d. at 136-37, 543 A.2d at 883.
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practice that prohibited character witnesses from testifYing about specific instances of conduct on direct examination. 68
In Hemingway, Eric Dwayne Hemingway was convicted of manslaughter for the shooting death of Randall Hickman. 69 There was
conflicting evidence presented as to the events leading up to the
shooting.7o Hemingway testified that Hickman and his party were the
initial aggressors, and, fearing an imminent attack, Hemingway
reached for his gun. 71 Hemingway claimed he panicked when Hickman attacked him, causing him to shoot and kill Hickman. 72 The defense called retired Officer Phillip Lance as a character witness to
testify that Hickman had a reputation for violence. 73 Lance gave his
opinion that Hickman was a very violent person based upon two investigations of prior crimes committed by Hickman. 74 The trial court
determined, out of the presence of the jury, that Lance's investigations of Hickman supported a reasonable basis for his opinion. 75 The
trial court, however, limited Lance to testifying that he was well-acquainted with Hickman, and that in Lance's opinion, Hickman was a
violent person. 76 Hemingway appealed this decision. 77
68. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-115 advisory committee's note
(discussing modification of the common-law practice that prohibited testimony by character witness regarding specific acts); see also supra Part II.A.
and II.B.
69. Hemingway, 76 Md. App. at 129-30, 543 A.2d at 880.
70. Id. at 130-31, 543 A.2d at 880. The confrontation between Hemingway and
Hickman took place at a gas station parking lot. Id. Mary Louise Johnson,
Susie Murphy and Anthony Vernon arrived first at the scene and were waiting for Hemingway when they were approached by Randall Hickman, Steve
Hickman and Randy Mullins. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 131, 543 A.2d at 880. Hemingway's testimony generated the issue of
self-defense. Id. at 132-33, 543 A.2d at 881-82. The court of appeals explained that when self-defense is raised, character evidence of the victim as
a violent person is admissible to corroborate evidence that the victim was
the initial aggressor. [d. The admissibility of opinion evidence regarding
the victim's character trait of violence is governed by section 9-115. Id. at
133-34, 543 A.2d at 881-82; see also MD. R. EVID. 5-404 (permitting the admissibility of character evidence where a defendant in a homicide trial
claims that the victim was the first aggressor, since the victim's character
trait of violence becomes relevant and admissible).
73. Hemingway, 76 Md. App. at 131, 543 A.2d at 880-8l.
74. Id. at 132, 543 A.2d at 881 (citing Lance's involvement in Hickman's conviction for manslaughter in 1979, and an unexecuted warrant for Hickman's
arrest based upon a charge of malicious wounding in 1981).
75. Id. at 131-32, 543 A.2d at 880-81.
76. Id. at 132, 543 A.2d at 881.

2000] Comparison of the Use of Character Witness Testimony

137

On appeal, the court of special appeals analyzed the admissibility of
the opinion evidence by interpreting section 9_115. 78 The court held
that on remand, during direct examination, Lance could give his
opinion of Hickman's violent character and support this opinion with
details of the 1978 and 1981 criminal investigations of Hickman. 79
At the same time the court decided Hemingway, Maryland undertook the project of adopting state rules of evidence. 8o A subcommittee was created to draft proposed rules of evidence for consideration
by the Rules Committee for Practice and Procedure and present them
before the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 81 In 1994, the Maryland
Rules of Evidence became effective, codified as Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure. Title 5 was based substantially on the Federal Rules of Evidence. 82 In addition, through the promulgation of
Maryland Rule 5-608, the drafters of the Maryland Rules of Evidence
expressly overruled Hemingway.83
III.

RESTRICTING THE USE OF CHARACTER WITNESS TESTIMONY: APPLICATION OF RULE 608 AND MARYLAND RULE
5-608

Under Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608, character evidence focuses on the credibility of the individual witness, rather than setting
forth reasons why specific testimony in the case should or should not
be believed. 84 Despite the content of the principal witness's testimony, it is the principal witness's character for veracity that is the subject of a character witness's testimony.85
77. [d. at 130, 543 A.2d at 880.
78. [d. at 133-35, 543 A.2d at 882.
79. [d. at 135-36, 543 A.2d at 882-83 ("No longer is a character witness prevented from speaking of specific acts or precluded from demonstrating a
basis of knowledge leading to his own independent opinion.").
80. See Hornstein, supra note 52, at 1033.
81. See id.
82. See MCLAIN, supra note 6, at VII.
83. MCLAIN, supra note 6, § 2.608.4, at 149. This subsection abrogated the former Maryland practice that allowed a character witness to testify on direct
examination about specific acts of truthfulness of the principal witness. [d.
84. See 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6113, at 43.
85. See United States v. Malady, 960 F.2d 57, 58 (8th Cir. 1992) (preventing a
character witness from being asked whether he believed the testimony of a
principal witness); see also 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 36, § 6.38,
at 813 (declaring that the proper question of a character witness is not
whether a particular statement is true, but whether the principal witness is a
truthful person); MuRPHY, supra note 2, § 1302(A), at 494 (stating that, in
Maryland, an impeaching witness can state whether he would believe the
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The probative value of character evidence is measured by the
weight of its effect on the trier of fact's perception of the principal
witness's credibility.86 Some commentators have raised doubts regarding the probative value of character evidence. 87 Psychological research suggests that evidence of the principal witness's character trait
for truthfulness may be less probative than the witness's response to
contextual factors, such as the courtroom and witness stand. 88 Additional scientific research concludes that there may be no single identifiable character trait indicative of truthfulness. 89 These theories
undermine the basic premise upon which the probative value of character evidence rests-how one acts in one situation is determinative of
how he or she will act in another situation. 90 Accordingly, the debate
over probative value lends itself to a restrictive rule of evidence.
The court's role when determining the admissibility of character
evidence is to promote "accurate fact-finding, protect witnesses from
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testimony of the other witness); 6 MCLAIN, supra note 1, § 608.2, at 71 (stating a character witness in Maryland may testify that she would not believe
the principal witness under oath).
See Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?J
Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 V.C.L.A. L. REv. 637, 655 (1991). The
probative value of evidence is determined "by comparing how probable
[the] proposition appeared before the evidence was presented with how
probable it appears afterwards." Id.
The California Law Revision Commission in rejecting Uniform Rule 47
opined:
Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very
prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on the particular occasion. It subtly
permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the
bad man because of their respecti~e characters despite what the
evidence in the case shows actually happened.
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note (quoting Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence: Art. VI Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility and Cal. Law Revision Comm'n,
Rep., Rec. & Studies, 615 (1964)); see also infra Part III.A.
See Friedman, supra note 86, at 64M7 (discussing situationist theories).
See Okun, supra note 8, at 547-48. A five-year study, subjecting over 11,000
children to situations where the trait of honesty was implicated, found that
the children did not exhibit a "unified character trait for honesty." Id.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text. These theories must be addressed
in conjunction with the considerations that lying is a "particularly difficult
type of behavior to study." Friedman, supra note 86, at 652. It is also very
difficult to simulate the jury decision-making process. Okun, supra note 8,
at 559 (acknowledging that most empirical studies are performed under
situations dramatically different from actual jury deliberations).
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harassment, and eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay."91 Conversely, the dangers underlying character evidence are: (1) erosion of
accurate fact-finding; (2) witness harassment; and (3) delay of the
trial.

A.

The Underlying Dangers

1.

Prejudicial Impact Erodes Accurate Fact-Finding

Character evidence can erode accurate fact-finding because of the
tendency of juries to accord it too much weight despite its "dubious"
probative value. 92 One of the dangers of admitting character evidence is the creation of collateral issues that distract the jury.93 For
example, a juror may form an image of a principal witness based on
evidence conveying minimal information that is noteworthy or unusual. 94 "When the character evidence is seemingly more interesting
than the material facts, the jury may get bogged down in collateral
issues and minor points that bear no specific link to the facts or parties in the case. 95
Character evidence can also undermine the jury's decision-making
process through its prejudicial effects. For example, if the character
witness is permitted to testifY about conduct of the principal witness
that is morally reprehensible, then the jury may associate the principal
witness with the party who called the witness and, therefore, be inclined to punish that party.96 Some psychologists believe that character evidence can be especially interesting to jurors who have been
taught the importance of truthfulness since childhood. 97
91. 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6112, at 32.
92. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, § 608.02[2] (warning "despite its
somewhat dubious probative value, the character evidence may have an
overwhelming impact"); see also 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6112.
93. See 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6112. Collateral issues are questions or issues not directly involved with the matter in question. See BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 835 (7th ed. 1999).
94. Okun, supra note 8, at 550.
95. 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6112, at 34 n.9. The author cited
Kerper & MacDonald, Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b): A Proposed Revision, 22
AKRON L. REv. 283, 291 (1989), which explained that other modes of impeachment focus on the present, whereas character impeachment focuses
on the past creating additional links in the chain of inferences.
96. Okun, supra note 8, at 550 n.77. The author cited Custar Ichheiser, Misunderstandings in Human Relations: A Study in False Social Perceptions, 55 AM. J.
Soc. 1, 28 (1949), which stated that "we have the tendency to consider a
partial structure of personality which happens to be visible to us as if this
partial structure were the total personality 'itself.'''
97. 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6113, at 42 n.12.
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Witness Harassment

A principal witness, who is not the accused, is not on trial and can
be found guilty of nothing. 98 Overly broad character evidence creates
an atmosphere of hostility for the principal witness. 99 Professor Wigmore stated that common decency called for limits on character evidence: "[The] ruthless flaying of personal character in the witness box
is not only cowardly-because there is no escape for the victim-and
brutal-because it inflicts the pain of public exposure of misdeeds to
idle bystanders-but it has often not the slightest justification of necessity."lOo The threat of overly broad character evidence makes coming forward and testifying significantly less palatable for witnesses. lOI
3.

Delay of the Trial

Allowing a character witness wide latitude in testifying about the
principal witness's character trait for veracity may dissolve a case into a
series of mini-trials, exposing the character and life history of a principal witness. 102 Consequently, this excursion prolongs the length of
the trial. Mter a character witness is brought forward to impeach a
principal witness, the sponsoring party may call a second character
witness to impeach the first character witness. 103 This stacking of
character witnesses drowns the material issues of the case in a sea of
witness testimony. 104

B.

Preventing the Underlying Dangers: Limitations on Character Witness
Testimony

Other rules of evidence, incidental to Rule 608 and Maryland Rule
5-608, operate to limit occurrences of the underlying dangers. For
98. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 921, at 724.
99. 3A id. ("[W]ithout any charge and without any trial, [the witness] may be
condemned by public opinion and disgraced before the community.").
100. 3A id. at 84l.
101. 3A see id. (resulting in the deprivation of justice to fully obtain useful
testimony) .
102. See 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6112.
103. See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 894, at 658 (noting that when "B is brought
forward to impeach A, and C to impeach B, it is obvious that not only might
there be no end to this process, but the real issues of the case might be
wholly lost sight of in the mass of testimony .... ").
104. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480 (1948) (recognizing that
in the "frontier phase of the law's development, calling friends to vouch for
good character and its counterpart-calling the rivals and enemies of a witness to impeach [the witness] ... were favorite and frequent ways of converting an individual litigation into a community contest and a trial into a
spectacle.") .
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example, Rule 403 105 gives the trial court discretion to exclude relevant evidence where the harm likely to result from its admis~ion substantially outweighs the probative value of, and the need for, the
evidence. 106 Similarly, Rule 611 107 grants the trial court power to reject cumulative or irrelevant testimony l08 and to exclude harassing
forms of evidence. 109
Most importantly, Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608 contain internal safeguards. When offering character evidence pursuant to these
rules, the character witness is limited to testifying: (1) for impeachment or rehabilitation purposes only after the principal witness has
testified; (2) about the principal witness's specific trait of truthfulness
or untruthfulness; and (3) in the form of an opinion or reputation.
105. FED. R. EVlD. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."). Accard MD. R. EVlD. 5-403. Rule 403 is the most commonly cited
Federal Rule of Evidence in cases determining the admissibility of impeachment evidence, while Maryland Rule 5-403 has been designated as "the allimportant 'clean-up batter' of evidence." Hornstein, supra note 52, at 1036;
5 MCLAIN, supra note 1, § 403.1, at 552.
106. FED. R. EVlD. 608 advisory comrriittee's note ("[TJhe overriding protection
of Rule 403 requires that probative value not be outweighed by danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury .... "); see also
United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 920 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing
that the probative value of character evidence for truthfulness must "outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the
jury"); United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 801-02 (10th Cir. 1990) (invoking Rule 403 where the probative value of reputation character evidence
was outweighed by potential prejudice); United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d
715,718-19 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that the trial court has discretion when
applying Rule 608 to ensure the overriding safeguards of Rules 403 and 611
are fulfilled).
107. FED. R. EVlD. 611 (a) ("The court shall exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to
(1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."). Accard MD. R.
EVlD.5-611(a).
108. See Ceders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976) (citing Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127 (1974) and County of Mason v. Shores, 97
U.S. 272 (1877)).
109. See United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 956 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding
the trial court's decision to prevent counsel from cross-examining a witness
regarding his sexual life because it was not probative of truthfulness and
would constitute harassment).
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Procedural Safeguards

Because it is presumed that all persons are truthful, the use of character evidence to prove truthfulness is only admissible after a character attack has been waged. IlO According to Rule 608 and Maryland
Rule 5-608, the sponsoring party cannot bolster the principal witness's
credibility for truthfulness through the use of a character witness prior
to an attempt to impeach by the adverse party. I 11 Absent any attack
on the principal witness's credibility, the presumption remains intact
that the principal witness is a truthful person. II2
Under Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608, all witnesses are impeachable once they testify.ll3 For example, if a criminal defendant
testifies, the prosecution may offer a character witness to testify about
the defendant's character for untruthfulness. 1l4 Once impeached,
the defense may offer a character witness to rehabilitate the criminal
defendant's credibility.II5
2.

Only the Specific Trait for Truthfulness is Relevant

The use of general character evidence increases the likelihood of
error and prejudice against the principal witness.u 6 As a result, Rule
608 and Maryland Rule 5-608 prohibit testimony about the general
character of the principal witness, but permit testimony about the
110. See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1104, at 233-34; MuRPHY, supra note 2,
§ 507(B), at 189-90.
111. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (2); MD. R. EVID. 5-608(a)(2); seeal50United States
v. Taylor, 900 F.2d 779, 782 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that it was improper
for the government to offer a police officer as a character witness to bolster
the credibility of an informant, who testified as a principal witness, before
the informant's credibility was attacked); United States v. Hicks, 748 F.2d
854,859 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that the sponsoring party could not question the principal witness on direct examination about the absence of a
prior criminal record because such an action bolstered the credibility of
the witness before the witness's truthfulness had been established). But see
United States v. Schatzle, 901 F.2d 252, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1990) (ruling that
the sponsoring party could question the principal witness on direct examination regarding a failure to list an arrest on a bar application because it
was a permissible line of questioning by the opposing party, thus, presenting the fact in the least damaging light possible).
112. 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6116, at 66 n.4.
113. FED. R. EVID. 608; MD. R. EVID. 5-608. Neither rule distinguishes between a
party who testifies and a non-party who testifies.
114. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, § 608.22[2][c][iii], at 608-61 (citing
United States v. Goodson, 155 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 1998)).
115. [d.
116. See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 923, at 728.
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principal witness's character for veracityY7 The distinction between
veracity and general character relates to the breadth of the testimony
about the principal witness's pertinent trait. llS For example, veracity
limits the scope of examination to the specific trait for truthfulness,119
while general character broadens the scope to include any of the principal witness's character traits. 120 By restricting character witness testimony to truthfulness, the goals are to sharpen relevancy, to reduce
surprise, time, and confusion, and to make the witness's role somewhat more attractive. 121
3.

Limited Methods of Proof

The method of proving character evidence plays a large part in anticipating where potential abuses may arise. 122 Generally, evidence of
pertinent character traits may be presented through testimony in the
form of an opinion, reputation, and specific instances of conduct. 123
Of the three methods, opinion and reputation evidence are the most
common forms of admissible character evidence, while evidence of
specific instances of conduct possesses the greatest capacity to arouse
prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time. 124 The previ117. FED. R EVlD. 608 advisory committee's note. "In accordance with the bulk
of judicial authority, the inquiry is strictly limited to character for veracity,
rather than allowing evidence as to character generally." 56 F.RD. 183,
267-68 (1973); accord MD. R EVlD. 5-608. See also United States v. Greer, 643
F.2d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding no error in sustaining objection to
question asked to character witness about principal witness's general reputation because it was not properly limited to the trait for truthfulness).
118. See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 922, at 727.
119. 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 35, § 6112, at 35.
120. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 922, at 727.
121. See FED. R EVlD. 608 advisory committee's note; 56 F.RD. 183, at 268 (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVlDENCE, § 44
(1954)).
122. See generally Leonard, supra note 14, at 1164-76 (discussing the safeguards in
Federal Rule 608 regarding specific instances).
123. FED. R EVlD. 405. The methods of proving character are:
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be
made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of
an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. (b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person
is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may
also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct.
Id.; accord MD. R EVlD. 5-405.
124. See FED. R EVlD. 405 advisory committee's note; 56 F.RD. 183,222 (1973).
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ously discussed underlying dangers of character evidence are most apparent when a character witness testifies about a specific instance of
the principal witness's conduct. 125 Consistent with the goal oflimiting
underlying dangers, Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608 permit only
reputation or opinion testimony as the methods of proving veracity to
impeach or rehabilitate the credibility of a witness. 126
Generally, both Rule 608(b) and Maryland Rule 5-608(b), prohibit
a character witness from testifying to specific instances of the principal
witness's conduct on direct examination. 127 Rule 608(b) provides that
when attacking or supporting a witness's credibility, specific instances
of conduct "may not be proved by extrinsic evidence."128 Similarly,
Maryland Rule 5-608 (a) (3) (B) expressly states that a character witness
"may not testify to specific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness
by the witness."129 In contrast, on cross-examination, opposing coun125. See supra Part III.A. Testimony of specific acts leads to the presentation of
irrelevant evidence used to prove whether some specific act, committed by
a principal witness, occurred. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7,
§ 608.21 (citing FED. R. EVID. 608(b)). When specific acts of a principal
witness are improperly presented before the jury, it may have an enormous
prejudicial impact. See Paul W. Grimm, Impeachment and Rehabilitation Under
the Maryland Rules of Evidence: An Attorney's Guide, 24 U. Balt. L. Rev. 95, 102
(noting that "proof of character trait by specific acts evidence is 'most likely
to create prejudice and hostility'"(quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 33, at 66 (2d ed. 1972))). Finally, allowing
testimony about specific instances of conduct causes witness harassment
and forces a witness to be prepared to defend any prior bad acts. See JOHN
H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 78 (4th ed. 1970);
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, §§ 608.01[3], 611.01 [l](a); GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 608.9,611.2 (2d ed. 1995).
126. See generally FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (3); MD. R. EVID. 5-404(a)(1)(C).
127. FED R. EVID. 608(b); MD. R. EVID. 5-608 (a) (3)(B).
128. FED R. EVID. 608(b) (indicating that, on direct examination, character witness testimony relating to specific conduct of a principal witness constitutes
extrinsic evidence); see also United States v. Hoskins, 628 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.
1980). In Hoskins, a federal officer testified that he was struck by the defendant. Id. at 296. The defense put forward a character witness to testify that
the officer was untruthful. Id. at 297. The trial court prohibited the character witness from testifying to specific examples of the officer's dishonesty.
Id. The court of appeals held that the trial court correctly refused extrinsic
evidence of specific acts to support the opinion of the character witness. Id.
at 296-97. In limited instances the rules of evidence permit extrinsic evidence of specific acts on direct examination of a witness. See FED. R. EVID.
609 (a) (2) ("[E]vidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement .... "); see also Bennett, supra note 14, at 581.
129. MD. R. EVID. 5-608 (a) (3)(B).
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sel may question a character witness about specific acts of the principal witness's conduct in limited situations to impeach the character
witness's knowledge of the principal witness, the trustworthiness and
accuracy of the character witness's knowledge, the basis for the character witness's opinion, and the character witness's candor and credibility.130 A character witness may also be questioned as to specific acts
of his or her own conduct that would be probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness. 131
At common law, a character witness could only testify about the
principal witness's reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 132
Although subjected to considerable debate, the formal rules of evidence broadened the scope of character witness testimony to allow
opinion evidence. 133 Admitting both forms of character evidence
swept away the "artificial distinction between reputation and opinion,"
because at common law, a witness describing an untruthful reputation
was actually "giving disguised opinion testimony."134 As one commentator described, "Now 'reputation witnesses' can also give their personal opinions about the honesty of the principal witness - which is
what they were really doing all along. The underlying idea is still the
same."135
Opinion evidence may be a more effective form of proof than reputation evidence because a jury is likely to give more weight to a character witness's personal endorsement of another witness as opposed to a
mere "endorsement purporting to convey what nameless others
think."136 Conversely, opinion character evidence might also be more
130. See Bennett, supra note 14, at 581.
131. MD. R. EVID. 5-608(b).
132. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Reputation is the total sum of
how we are known and seen by others. See Taylor v. State, 28 Md. App. 560,
563 n.3, 346 A.2d 718, 720 n.3 (1975). The reputation of the principal
witness is based on what the character witness has heard others say about
the principal witness or what the character witness has discussed with others
regarding the principal witness. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469,477 (1948). In the alternative, a character witness may also testify that
the principal witness has no reputation, if it is probable that the character
witness would have heard of any reputation for veracity if it existed. See id.
at 478 (basing reputation testimony on the assumption that if no ill is reported of one, his or her reputation must be good).
133. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
134. 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 36, § 261, at 142-43 (noting that the
mechanical repetition of a set formula by the reputation witness has been
seen for what it usually is-a thinly veiled form of personal opinion).
135. McElhaney, supra note 2, at 62.
136. 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 36, § 261, at 143; see also Mason Ladd,
Techniques and Theory oj Character Evidence, 24 IOWA L. REv. 498, 511 (1939).
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prejudicial than reputation evidence,I37 and is more likely to infringe
on the trier of fact's decision-making process. 13S Nevertheless, opinion evidence is the prominent method of proof.
C.

The Foundation for the Proof of Character

1.

Requiring a Character Witness to Have a Reasonable Basis

The overall admissibility and weight of character evidence is based
upon an assumption that the character witness has an adequate foundation to support an opinion or testimony about the principal witness's reputation. I39 In addition to the previously discussed
requirements expressly contained in Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5608, both rules require the character witness to support his or her
testimony with an adequate foundation. 14o
Requiring an adequate foundation has two components. First, it
has a prophylactic component that protects a principal witness from
an unsupported character attack. 141 This part is aimed at convincing
the trial court. I42 Second, requiring an adequate foundation gives
weight and credibility to a character witness's testimony.143 This part
is aimed at convincing the trier of fact. The trial court retains both

137.
138.

139.
140.
141.

142.

Opinion evidence is often the most trustworthy form of character evidence
because personal judgment is better than reputation evidence based on the
hearsay gossip of a community. [d. Moreover, evidence of reputation does
not necessarily equate to character. [d. at 506 ("[C]haracter is an existent
quality apart from any reputation ... [c]haracter is what a person actually
is, while reputation is what his neighbors and those with whom he associates say he is.").
Ladd, supra note 136, at 510-1l.
See id. at 510 ("[C]haracter is the fact in issue from which other facts may be
inferred, to permit a witness to express opinion of character would be an
invasion of the province of the jury.").
See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 376 (1994).
See supra Part III.C.l.a-b.
See MD. R. EVlD. 5-405 advisory committee's note (acknowledging that it is
unfair to allow opinions without a proper basis); MD. R. EVlD. 5-608 advisory
committee's note (finding that a required reasonable basis is a protection
of Rule 5-608).
Hemingway v. State, 76 Md. App. 127, 134, 543 A.2d 879, 882 (1988)
("[T]he party who offers the personal opinion of a character witness must
first convince the trial judge that the witness possesses an adequate basis for
forming an opinion as to another person's character. (citations omitted).
See id. at 135, 543 A.2d at 882 ("Clearly, the bald conclusion of the [character] witness without any reason to support it hardly commends the opinion
for serious consideration by the trier of fact.").
H

)

143.
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the responsibility to ensure a character witness is qualified to testify,
and the discretion to control the scope of that testimony.144
Normally, the trial court will excuse the jury from the courtroom
before determining whether the character witness is qualified to testify.145 This qualifying procedure is completed outside the presence
of the jury to shield the jury from any improper testimony.146 The
applicable standards for qualifying a character witness depends, in
part, on the form of the testimony.147 For example, reputation evidence requires that the character witness have contact with the principal witness's community for a length of time sufficient to become
aware of the reputation. 148 Similarly, opinion evidence requires the
character witness to have first-hand knowledge of the principal wit-

144. When analyzing character evidence, the trial court is relied upon to factor
in all the underlying policies, considerations, and rules. See MCLAIN, supra
note 6, § 2.104.4, at 69 (discussing the role of the judge on questions of
admissibility of evidence); see also Durkin v. State, 284 Md. 445, 453, 397
A.2d 600, 605 (1979) (referring to the trial judge's decision as a "threshold
function" for the admissibility of character evidence).
145. The trial court has discretion to determine which preliminary matters
should be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. FED. R. EVlD. 104(c)
advisory committee's notes. In Jensen and HeminfSWay, the trial court dismissed the jury from the courtroom before qualifying the character witnesses. See infra Part III.C.2.a for a discussion of Jensen. See supra notes 668~ and accompanying text for a discussion of HeminfSWay.
146. In jury cases, an evidentiary ruling may be made out of the hearing of the
jury to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury. FED.
R. EVlD. 103(c). A court ruling excluding evidence is useless if the excluded evidence ultimately comes before the jury. FED. R. EVlD. 103(c) advisory committee's note (citing Bruton v. United States, 389 U.S. 818
(1968».
147. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
148. United States v. Ruiz-Castro, 92 F.3d 1519, 1529-30 (lOth Cir. 1996) (excluding character witnesses because they did not have sufficient acquaintance with the principal witness); United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782,
802 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that a principal witness's reputation for veracity formed by a high school principal over a three year period was admissible); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1552 (10th Cir.
1988) (permitting reputation testimony where character witness was a
member of community for eleven years and dealt regularly with the principal witness for two years); United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1381-82
(11th Cir. 1982) (excluding reputation testimony, in part, because the
character witness had contact with the witness for only a short time);
United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1370 (4th Cir. 1979) (allowing reputation testimony to be based on the workplace community).
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ness,149 however, there is no requirement of a sufficient period of
acquaintance. 150
This adequate foundation consists of a "reasonable basis" to support
a character witness's testimony.151 Although both Rule 608 and Maryland Rule 5-608 require this foundation, there are slight differences in
the way this requirement is articulated. Unlike Maryland Rule 5-608,
Rule 608 makes no express reference to permitting a character witness
to give a "reasonable basis."152 One commentator recognized the flaw
that "the Federal Rules of Evidence never even mention what has to
happen before you can impeach a witness."153 Consequently, we look
to case law for guidance.

a.

Federal Case Law Establishing the Reasonable Basis Requirement

In 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Lollar- 54 recognized that although it is more desirable
for counsel to first ask the character witness about the foundation supporting opinion testimony, Rule 608(a) does not require this foundation. 155 Three years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Watson 156 distinguished the requisite basis for admitting reputation testimony157 from admitting opin149. United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135, 139 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that Rule
701 limits witness testimony regarding truthfulness to first-hand knowledge); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, § 608.13[2] (stating that witness
testimony based on personal knowledge is a requirement of Rule 701); see
also FED. R. EVID. 602 (requiring an evidentiary finding that a witness has
"personal knowledge" of the subject).
150. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL
§ 12.03[2], at 12-30 (4th ed. 1999) ("There are no prerequisites of long
acquaintance ... cross-examination can be expected to expose defects of
lack of familiarity .... ").
151. See 3 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 85, § 6.38, at 813-14; MuRPHY,
supra note 2, § 1302(A), at 495.
152. Compare FED R. EVID. 608 with MD. R. EVID. 5-608 (a) (3) (B). Maryland Rule
of Evidence 608(a) (3) (B) states that "a character witness may give a reasonable basis for testimony." MD. R. EVlD. 608(a)(3)(B). Federal Rule 608
does not contain such a provision. FED R. EVID. 608.
153. McElhaney, supra note 2, at 62.
154. 606 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1979).
155. [d. at 589 (acknowledging that character witnesses may be asked for an
opinion of the principal witness's character for truthfulness, but Rule 608
imposes no prerequisite testimony).
156. 669 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1982).
157. [d. at 1382 (recognizing that reputation testimony requires the character
witness to have sufficient acquaintance with the principal witness's commu-
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ion testimony. ISS The court emphasized that Rule 602 159 imposed a
"personal knowledge" requirement on Rule 608 opinion testimony.160
The court held that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of
opinion witnesses who satisfied the personal knowledge
requirement. 161
In United States v. Dotson,162 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit further established the requirement of a reasonable
basis for opinion testimony. The court held that it was error for the
trial court to allow opinion testimony absent a reasonable basis. 163 At
trial, Frederick Dotson was charged with three counts of receiving firearms. 164 In defense, Dotson testified that the firearms were obtained
prior to his earlier convictions, and he reclaimed the firearms because
of variolJs threats on his life. 165 Dotson offered his own exculpatory
testimony and the testimony of four principal witnesses. 166 In response, the government offered the testimony of character witnesses
to give opinions that "Dotson and one or more of his witnesses were
not of truthful character" and would lie under oath. 167 The defense
counsel objected to the government's character witnesses claiming
that they lacked the proper basis for giving opinion testimony.l68 The
trial court overruled the objection and allowed the character witnesses

158.
159.

160.
161.

162.
163.
164.

165.
166.
167.

168.

nity to ensure that the testimony adequately reflects the community assessment) (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478 (1948».
Id. at 1382 (noting that opinion testimony does not require a long acquaintance with the principal witness as a foundation for admissibility).
Rule 602 states in pertinent part, "[a] witness may not testify to a matter
unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." FED. R. EVID. 602.
Watson, 669 F.2d at 1382.
Id. (noting that the four opinion witnesses were improperly excluded because the trial court applied the wrong foundational standard for opinion
testimony). The voir dire of the four witnesses revealed that they had firsthand knowledge of the principal witness because they worked with him. Id.
at 1382-83, 1382 n.6.
799 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 193.
Id. at 190 (noting that the charges were related to defendant's past criminal
history because, "[a]s a result of [Dotson's] status as a convicted felon on
parole, federal law [18 U.S.C. § 922(h)] prohibited Dotson from knowingly
receiving firearms").
Id.
Id.
Id. at 190-91 (noting that the government called two FBI agents, a state
narcotics agent, and an IRS agent to opine as to the truthfulness of Dotson
and his principal witnesses).
Id. at 191.
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to testify. 169 Dotson was convicted and sentenced to five years
imprisonment. 170
On appeal, the court agreed with Dotson's argument that there was
no reasonable basis for the opinions of the government's character
witnesses. 171 The court's analysis distinguished its prior holding in
United States v. Lollar. 172 Recognizing that Rule 701 operated to ensure
the reliability and relevance of opinion character evidence,173 the
court held that "[iJn the absence of some underlying basis to demonstrate that the opinions were more than bare assertions that the defendant and his witnesses were persons not to be believed, the opinion
evidence should not have been admitted."174
In later cases, federal appellate courts found the reasoning in Dotson
persuasive and held that before opinion testimony is admissible the
character witness must have a reasonable basis. 175 In effect, this case
law imposed the requirement that a reasonable basis exist to support
Rule 608 opinion evidence. 176
169. [d.
170. [d.
171. [d. at 193 (declaring that opinion testimony based solely on an investigation
constitutes an inadequate basis). The court noted one exception: that the
IRS agent had a reasonable basis for his opinion of Erma Dotson's truthfulness based upon a series of interviews, an investigation of her tax returns
and financial information, and a study of her earlier grand jury testimony.
[d.

172. [d. at 191-92 (contrasting that in Lollar the challenge to character evidence
was to the method of proof, whereas in the instant case, the challenge
raised an issue on the limits to the introduction of opinion testimony).
173. Jd. at 192. Federal Rule 701, entitled Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses,
provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testimony
in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions
or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of
the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
FED. R. EVlD. 701; acevrd MD. R. EVlD. 5-701.
174. Dotson, 799 F.2d at 193.
175. See United States v. McMurray, 20 F.3d 831,834 (8th Cir. 1994) (permitting
a character witness to testify if there is an adequate showing "that the opinions were more than bare assertions" (quoting Dotson, 799 F.2d at 189»;
United States v. Cortez, 935 F.2d 135, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting
opinion testimony that lacked a sufficiently reliable basis).
176. See Cindy F. Willard, United States v. Dotson: When Should opinion Testimony
as to the Truth and Veracity of a Witness be Allowed?, 12 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc.
497, 50(H)8 (1988) (discussing the impact of the holding in Dotson on subsequent cases). Willard concluded in her article that as a result of Dotson,
"[w]hen courts are faced with allowing or disallowing impeaching, opinion
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Expressly Permitting a Reasonable Basis in Maryland

The pre-rules practice governing the admissibility of character evidence in Maryland was contained in section 9-115 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 177
Courts interpreted section 9-115 as "requiring" a reasonable basis. 178
When Maryland Rule 5-608 was codified, the drafters expressly included subsection (a) (3) (B). This subsection is consistent with the
federal courts interpretation of the corresponding federal rule,179 and
expressly states: "on direct examination, a character witness may give a
reasonable basis for testimony as to reputation or an opinion as to the
character of the witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness, but may
not testify to specific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness by the
witness."lso Consistent with the pre-rules practice, lSI Maryland Rule
5-608 was interpreted to "require" a reasonable basis.ls2

2.

What Constitutes a "Reasonable Basis?"

Once the trial court is satisfied the character witness possesses the
requisite foundation to testify, the court must still ensure that the
character witness's testimony, when elicited in the jury's presence,
complies within the scope of Rule 608 or Maryland Rule 5-608. While
it is clear that a character witness is required to provide a reasonable
basis, it is less than certain what that constitutes. 1s3 The authors of the

177.

178.

179.

180.
181.

182.
183.

testimony, they must determine if the impeaching witness has a substantial
basis on which to form his opinion." Id. at 510.
See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. More specifically, section 9115 stated in pertinent part, "no person offered as a character witness who
has an adequate basis for forming an opinion as to another person's character shall hereafter be excluded from giving evidence based on personal
opinion to prove character. ... " MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &Juo. PROC. § 9-115
(emphasis added).
See Hemingway v. State, 76 Md. App. 127, 134, 543 A.2d 879, 882 (1988)
(citing Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 418 A.2d 217 (1980) and Durkin v.
State, 284 Md. 445, 397 A.2d 600 (1979)).
See supra note 300 and accompanying text. In general, Maryland Rule 5-608
is a substantial revision of its federal counterpart. See Hornstein, supra note
52, at 1057.
MD. R. EVID. 5-608 (emphasis added).
See supra note 178 and accompanying text. When admitting character witness testimony, the courts must apply both Maryland Rule 5-608 and section 9-115. SeeJensen v. State, 355 Md. 692,700,736 A.2d 307, 311 (1999).
See infra Part III.C.2.a.
See infra Part III.C.2.a & b; see also United States v. McMurray, 20 F.3d 831,
834 (8th Cir. 1994) (permitting a character witness to testify who knew the
character witness through business dealings); Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298,
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Federal Rules of Evidence envisioned that a reasonable basis consisted
of testimony as to the nature and extent of the acquaintance. 184 Similarly, the authors of the Maryland Rules of Evidence envisioned that a
reasonable basis consisted of testimony covering "such matters as how
long the witnesses have been acquainted, under what circumstances,
etc."185 Of course, what the authors envisioned may be quite different
from a court's interpretation.

a. Jensen v. State
In Jensen v. State,186 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the
trial court erred by restricting a character witness from testifying to
the full basis for her opinion. 187 On June 17, 1996, on a rural road in
Virginia, Adrian Pilkington was stabbed two times by the defendant,
Jason Jensen, and while still alive, placed in the trunk of his car. 188

184.

185.

186.
187.

188.

302-04, 418 A.2d 217, 219-20 (1980) (stating that there was an insufficient
basis when basis for opinion was intertwined with results of a polygraph
test); Durkin v. State, 284 Md. 445, 453-54, 397 A.2d 600, 605 (1979) (stating that there was an insufficient basis where character witness was police
chief who had a "brief and limited encounter with the witness"); Wilson v.
State, 103 Md. App. 722, 726, 654 A.2d 936, 937 (1995) (permitting a character witness to testify who knew the principal witness for over one year as a
friend and instructor); Barnes v. State, 57 Md. App. 50, 59, 468 A.2d 1040,
1044 (1984) (permitting opinion testimony where witness had repeatedly
interviewed principal witness for over two years); Chadderton v. State, 54
Md. App. 86, 96, 456 A.2d 1313, 1319 (1983) (excluding opinion testimony
of a twelve-year old where no basis was proffered besides the witness's inability to remember when he met the principal witness).
The Advisory Committee's Note for Rule 608 states: U[aJs to the use of specific instances on direct by an opinion witness, see the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 405." FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee's note.
Citing Rule 701, the Advisory Committee's Note in Rule 405 states:
"[oJpinion testimony on direct ... ought in general to correspond to reputation testimony as now given, i.e., be confined to the nature and extent of
observation and acquaintance upon which the opinion is based." FED. R.
EVID. 405 advisory committee's note.
20 MD. REG. Issue 15 pt. II at P-14 (July 23, 1993); see also MCLAIN, supra
note 6, § 2.608.4, at 149 ("[AJ 'reasonable basis' for opinion testimony
would be how long and under what circumstances the character witness
knows the other witness, e.g., they have worked side by side on the assembly
line for ten years and they eat lunch together every workday.").
355 Md. 692, 736 A.2d 307 (1999).
Id. at 708,736 A.2d at 315. The holding was of little significance to jensen's
conviction because of the finding of harmless error. See infra notes 22M2
and accompanying text.
Jensen, 355 Md. at 694, 736 A.2d at 308.
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Jensen drove Pilkington's car accompanied by Brian Wooldridge,Jean
Nance and Rachel Whitman. The car stopped at a bridge in Frederick, Maryland, where Pilkington was removed from the trunk and
thrown into the Potomac River.189 On June 21, 1996, Pilkington's
dead body was removed from the Potomac River a few miles from the
Route 17 bridge in Brunswick City. 190 Jensen, Wooldridge, Nance and
Whitman were arrested and tried separately for the murder of
Pilkington. 191
At Jensen's trial, the jury was presented with conflicting testimony
about events occurring the night of Pilkington's death. Wooldridge
testified on behalf of the State againstJensen,192 and Jensen testified
to his own exculpatory version of events. 193 In response to Wooldridge'S testimony, the defense called Melissa Goff as a character witness to impeach his credibility.194 The defense posed preliminary
questions to Goff regarding her familiarity with Wooldridge. 195 Goff
testified she knew Wooldridge for over a year, during which time she
saw him approximately once a week and spoke to him every day.196
Defense counsel next asked Goff, "[D]o you have an opinion as to
[Wooldridge's] veracity to tell the truth?"197 At this point, the State
objected to the question on the grounds of insufficient basis to give an
opinion. 198 The court dismissed the jury from the courtroom and allowed defense counsel to continue questioning GOff. 199 Goff responded as to the basis of her opinion:
189.
190.
191.
192.

193.

Id. at 694-95, 736 A.2d at 308.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 695,736 A,2d at 308. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wooldridge testified against Jensen in exchange for his guilty plea of conspiracy to commit
first degree murder with a maximum of fifteen years imprisonment. Id. at
712,736 A.2d at 317. Wooldridge testified thatJensen delivered the mortal
stab wound, that Jensen and Nance threw Pilkington's body over the
bridge, and that during these events he fearfully remained in the car at
Jensen's threatening command. Id. at 713-14, 736 A,2d at 318-19.
Id. at 695, 736 A,2d at 308. Jensen claimed that he had no intent to harm
Pilkington, that Wooldridge removed the knife from the trunk, and that he
feared he was the intended victim of a conspiracy to commit assault and
murder. Id. at 714-15,736 A,2d at 319. Jensen admitted that he accidentally
stabbed the victim once in the shoulder acting out of self-defense.
jensen, 355 Md. at 695, 736 A,2d at 308.
Id. at 695-96, 736 A.2d at 308-09.
Id.
Id. at 697, 736 A.2d at 309.

194.
195.
196.
197.
198. !d.
199. Id.

Baltimore Law Review

154

[Vol. 30

A lot of the stories that [Wooldridge] told me didn't add up,
saying that-one day he would tell me something that happened on that day and then a couple days later he would tell
me something else that had happened on that day that
wouldn't have been able to happen if what he said before
was true. 200
Goff then stated that this type of exchange with Wooldridge happened "repeatedly."201
The court determined that this testimony supported a reasonable
basis for Goff's opinion and directed the jury to return to the courtroom. 202 Once the jury returned, Goff was asked to state her opinion
regarding Wooldridge's truthfulness. 203 She responded, "I think that
he's a compulsive liar."204 The defense attorney then asked, "What do
you base that opinion on?"205 Again, the State objected, and the
judge called a bench conference. 206
The State argued at the bench conference that defense counsel was
attempting to elicit testimony of specific instances of conduct from
Goff on direct examination. 207 The court agreed with the State's argument that allowing testimony of specific instances would violate Maryland Rule 5_608. 208 Goff's testimony was restricted to her opinion
that Wooldridge was a compulsive liar based on her one year relationship with him.209 At the close of the trial, Jensen was found guilty.210
He appealed the trial court's decision to limit the testimony of
Goff. 21 1
On appeal, Jensen complained that "without allowing for some evidence of reasonable basis, a jury 'will not be impressed with a bald
conclusion of personal opinion. "'212 Jensen argued that if Goff were
allowed to further explain why she believed that Wooldridge was a
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

[d. at 697, 736 A.2d at 309.
[d.

[d.
[d. at 697, 736 A.2d at 309-10.
[d.
[d.
[d.
jensen, 355 Md. at 697-98, 736 A.2d at 310.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 698, 736 A.2d at 310. Jensen was convicted of first-degree murder,
conspiracy to murder, and assault with intent to commit murder. [d.
211. [d. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court's
decision, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to determine whether Goff should have been allowed to give the basis underlying
her opinion that Wooldridge was a compulsive liar. [d.
212. [d. (quoting Petitioner jensen's argument on appeal).
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compulsive liar, the jury would disregard Wooldridge's testimony and
accord more weight to Jensen's version of events. 213
According to the State, Goff's proffered testimony was properly excluded by the trial court as "'a number of specific events tied together' "214 that amounted to specific acts of conduct, which was
prohibited by Rule 5-608 (b). 215 The State further contended that
Rule 5-608 "'embodies a restrictive approach designed to avoid diverting the jury's attention and creating mini-trials on the issue of a witness's credibility,"'216 and that the proper limits of reasonable basis
testimony consist of "how long and under what circumstances the witnesses have been acquainted."217 Mter reviewing the arguments, the
court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting Goff's testimony.218
The court of appeals analyzed the content of Goff's statement and
applied it to the definition of specific instance. 219 The court found
"specific" defined as "of an exact or particular nature," "particular,"
"precise."22o The court concluded that Goff did not testifY to a particular incident. 221 Rather, she testified as a general matter to Wooldridge's tendency to tell inconsistent stories. 222 The court recognized
the danger that "once a character witness testifies to a specific instance" of the principal witness's conduct, "the jury's focus necessarily
turns to whether in fact that particular event occurred .... "223 The
court found, however, that danger was nonexistent in the instant case.
Contrasting the effect of Goff's statement to the effect of specific instance testimony, the court concluded that Goff's testimony "would
not serve to distract and confuse the jury, nor would it consume time
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

219.
220.

221.
222.
223.

[d.
[d. (quoting Respondent State's argument on appeal).
[d.
[d. (quoting Respondent State's argument on appeal).
[d.
[d. at 708-09,736 A.2d at 315-16 (affirming the trial court's conviction upon
a finding that the improper restriction of Goff's testimony was harmless error
because even assuming the trier of fact found Wooldridge's testimony untruthful, the remainder of the State's evidence proved Jensen's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
jensen, 355 Md. at 699-700, 736 A.2d at 310-11.
[d. at 699, 736 A.2d at 310 (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1398 (6th ed.
1990)).
[d.
[d. at 699, 736 A.2d at 311.
[d. at 699-700, 736 A.2d at 311 (referencing the relationship of Maryland
Rule 5-608 (a) (3) (B) to Rules 608(b) and 405(b) to highlight the dangers
of specific instances).
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by altering the focus of the trial to other particular events."224 Finally,
the court found that Goff's proffered testimony was permissible because "a character witness [is] entitled to some latitude in informing
the jury as to the basis for an opinion .... "225
Next, the court analyzed whether the trial court abused its discretion in limiting Goff's testimony.226 To answer this question, the court
addressed section 9-115 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
and Maryland Rule 5-608. 227 The court defined the phrase "reasonable basis for testimony" in light of the law at the time Maryland Rule 5608(a) (3) was adopted. 228
The court recognized that the 1971 enactment of section 9-115 abrogated the common law. 229 Section 9-115 was broadly interpreted
and applied by the Maryland courts in Durkin v. State,230 Kelley v.
State,231 and Hemingway v. State. 232
In addition, the court reviewed the legislative history of Maryland
Rule 5-608 and determined that the final draft was a compromise between expressly overruling the admissibility of specific instances on
direct examination and a broadening of Maryland Rule 5-608 beyond
the scope of Rule 608. 233 The court found "a strong indication" that
the 1994 court of appeals intended that Maryland Rule 5-608 exceed
Rule 608 in what was allowed before the trier of fact as the basis for an
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 700, 736 A.2d at 31l.
Id. at 708, 736 A.2d at 315.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701, 736 A.2d at 311-12.
284 Md. 445, 453, 397 A.2d 600, 605 (1979). Here the court emphasized
that section 9-115 permitted the reasonable basis for the personal opinion
of character to be presented for the trier of fact's consideration along with
the bare opinion. Id.; see also jensen, 355 Md. at 702, 736 A.2d at 312.
23l. 288 Md. 298, 302, 418 A.2d 217,219 (1980) (asserting that "[9-115] permits
the admission of a broad range of testimony which may aid the jury in assessing the credibility of a witness"); see also jensen, 355 Md. at 702, 736 A.2d
at 312.
232. 76 Md. App. 127, 133-35,543 A.2d 879, 882 (1988) (noting that the court
went so far as to admit specific instances of conduct to impeach a witness's
credibility on direct examination under section 9-115). Since then jensen
has overruled Hemingway. See jensen, 355 Md. at 724, 736 A.2d at 324.
233. jensen, 355 Md. at 707-08,736 A.2d at 315. In 1988, the first proposed draft
of Maryland Rule 5-608 mirrored Federal Rule 608 in language and substance but was not reported to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Instead, a
second draft, which added section (a) (3) (B) expressly permitting a reasonable basis, was reported and adopted as Maryland Rule 5-608. See id. at 70405, 736 A.2d at 313-14.
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opinion. 234 The court recognized that Federal Rule 405 confines the
permissible basis for supporting opinion testimony under Rule 608 to
the nature and extent of observation and acquaintance. 235 The court
found, however, that the Federal Rule 405 standard was not a limit on
Maryland Rule 5-608 because of the intent of Maryland Rule 5-608 to
extend beyond Rule 608. 236
The court also distinguished Rule 608 from Maryland Rule 5-608
based upon the language in the text and also the reporters' notes. 237
First, the text in Maryland Rule 5-608 differed from that used in Rule
608 because where Rule 608 is silent, Maryland Rule 5-608 expressly
allows the character witness to give a reasonable basis for an opinion. 238 Second, the content of the respective reporters' notes differed. 239 The court found that the Federal Reporter's notes were
restrictive, while the Maryland language was illustrative. 240 These differences further supported a finding of intent to distinguish the two
rules.
Mter reviewing the history and language of Maryland Rule 5-608,
the court concluded that a character witness should be allowed latitude to offer something to the jury beyond a bare conclusion that the
witness is or is not a truthful person, but should not offer specific
instances of conduct. 241 The court held that a character witness's testimony supporting a "reasonable basis" is not restricted only to the
length and manner of acquaintance with the principal witness. 242
Judge Chasanow concurred with the majority's affirmance of Jensen's conviction, but dissented with finding error in the trial court's
restriction on Goff's reasonable basis testimony.243 Judge Chasanow
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.at 707, 736 A.2d at 315.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jensen, 355 Md. at 706-07, 736 A.2d at 314.
Id. at 708 n.6, 763 A.2d at 315-16 n.6 (making the distinction that the Federal Rule Advisory Committee provided that opinion testimony ought in
general to be confined to the nature and extent of observation and acquaintance, as opposed to the Maryland Rule Reporter's Note, which envisioned
that reasonable basis cover such matters as how long and under what
circumstances) .
241. Id. at 708,736 A.2d at 315 (recognizing that it is fair to infer from Maryland
Rule 5-608 and its history that a character witness can give meaningful opinion testimony).
242. Id. at 707, 736 A.2d at 315.
243. Id. at 722-23, 736 A.2d at 323 (Chasanow,j., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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argued that the majority's holding allowed character witness testimony that improperly exceeded the scope of Maryland Rule 5_608. 244
He opined that the trial court had not abused its discretion by limiting
Goff's testimony.245 Judge Chasanow advocated a strict interpretation
of Maryland Rule 5-608, emphasizing that the adoption of Maryland
Rule 5-608 overruled Hemingway v. State. 246 He pointed out that the
m~ority failed to recognize a vital distinction in the application of
Maryland Rule 5-608 (a) (3)(B) that, "[i]t is quite clear that the rule is
intended to allow the character witness to express the reasonable basis
for arriving at an opinion, not the reasonable basis for the opinion
arrived at."247 This position supports a more restrictive approach to
the admissibility of character evidence. 248
b.

United States v. Murray

In United States v. Murray,249 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit was faced with the same challenge of defining the
scope of what constitutes a reasonable basis. Michael Murray was
charged with the murder of Juan Carlos Bacallo and conspiracy to
distribute cocaine. 250 The government called Richard Brown as a
244. Id. at 725-26, 736 A.2d at 325 (applying a strict interpretation of "reasonable basis" that limits testimony to "how long and under what circumstances
the character witness knew the primary witness, or how often and under
what circumstances the character witness discussed the reputation of the
primary witness").
245. Id. at 725-26, 736 A.2d at 325 (finding that Goff's testimony was more similar to specific instances of conduct than a reasonable basis for an opinion,
and, therefore, was properly excluded by the trial court pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-608(b)).
246. Id. at 724-25,736 A.2d at 324 (quoting LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF
EVIDENCE § 2.608.4 at 149 (West 1994) (citing Hemingway v. State, 76 Md.
App. 127,543 A.2d 879 (1988))).
247. Id. at 724,736 A.2d at 324. Judge Chasanow also condemned the usage of
the nomenclature "compulsive liar" to describe the principal witness's character for veracity. Id. at 723, 736 A.2d at 323 (arguing that "compulsive"
was inappropriate because it added an indication of psychological defect,
because there is an obvious difference between an untruthful person and a
person who has an uncontrollable compulsion to lie).
248. Id. at 723, 736 A.2d at 323. Judge Chasanow recognized that the trier of
fact has a brief opportunity to observe a witness and little basis for making
critical judgments about a witness's veracity. To alleviate the trier of fact's
dilemma without violating the rights of a witness, the evidence should be
presented in a manner that minimizes its inflammatory nature. Id.
249. 103 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997).
250. Id. at 313.
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principal witness to testify against Murray.251 Brown was vigorously
cross-examined by the defense, which was considered by the court as
an attack on Brown's credibility.252 In response, the government offered Lieutenant Goshert as a character witness to rehabilitate
Brown's character. 253 Goshert testified that in his opinion Brown was
"extremely reliable."254 Additionally, Goshert testified that based on
Brown's help as an informant, the police department had "made" in
"excess of sixty-five" cases and obtained search warrants "numerous
times."255 The defense argued that Goshert's testimony violated Rule
608(b) because it was extrinsic evidence of Brown's character for
truthfulness. 256 The trial court found that Goshert's testimony was
proper, thereby constituting a reasonable basis supporting his opinion. 257 Murray was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life in
prison. 258
On appeal, Murray argued that Goshert's testimony was improperly
admitted into evidence. 259 The government argued that Goshert's testimony was proper as supporting a reasonable basis for his opinion. 260
The Third Circuit held that admitting Goshert's entire testimony was
error in violation of Rule 608(b).261 The court dissected Goshert's
251. [d. at 314. Brown, a taxi-cab driver, picked up Murray on the night of the
murder. [d. Brown testified that, after Murray and the victim walked away
from the cab, he heard gunshots and he saw Murray return to the cab with
a pistol. [d. Brown further testified that he was told by Murray "that is what
someone gets for being in violation," but he never saw the victim return to
the cab. [d.
252. [d. at 321 (eliciting from Brown, on cross-examination, an admission of his
past involvement in various illegal activities).
253. Murray, 103 F.3d at 321.
254. [d. (noting this reliability in terms of accuracy of the information Brown
provided the Harrisburg Police Department since 1988).
255. [d.
256. [d.
257. [d.
258. [d. at 316.
259. [d. at 321 (arguing that Goshert's testimony that Brown had "made" cases
for the police department was an improper quantification constituting specific instances of Brown's conduct).
260. [d. The government argued that:
[T]here has got to be some basis for the jury to know [Goshert]
can give that opinion as to [Brown's] reputation. And by letting
the jury know they have a close working relationship over a period
of time and that they have been involved in all of these incidents,
then there is a basis for him giving that opinion.
[d.
261. [d. (recognizing that extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a principal
witness's conduct as proof of truthfulness violates Rule 608(b».
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testimony, separating the admissible from inadmissible portions. 262
The court explained that Goshert's testimony regarding the police use
of Brown as a confidential informant on "numerous occasions" since
1988 was admissible to establish a reasonable basis for his opinion as
to Brown's character for truthfulness. 263 The portion of Goshert's testimony that Brown had "made" sixty-five cases, however, was inadmissible because it was more specific than can be justified as necessary to
establish a foundation. 264 The court found that the error was not
harmless and remanded the case with instructions that the court
should limit Goshert's testimony.265
The Murray court relied in part on the reasoning used by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to decide a similar issue. 266 In United States v. Taylor,267 a police.informant, Tony Phillips, testified as a principal witness against the defendant, Henry
Taylor, who was charged and convicted of possession and intent to
distribute an illegal substance. 268 The government introduced the testimony of Officer Black to support the credibility of Phillips.269 Black
testified that Phillips had acted as a buyer for the government on fIfteen to eighteen drug buys, and that Phillips had given reliable information and testimony that resulted in the guilty pleas and convictions
of drug sellers. 27o The jury returned a guilty verdict, which Taylor
appealed. 271 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Black's testimony was improper as extrinsic evidence
used to bolster the credibility of Phillips.272 The court vacated the
conviction and remanded the case for retrial. 273
262.
263.
264.
265.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 322 (emphasizing that the government's case depended largely on
the testimony of an informant, which created the need for a character witness to testify as to the informant's reliability).

266. [d.
267. 900 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1990).
268. [d. at 780-81 (citing Phillips' testimony as the only direct testimony of Taylor's guilt).
269. [d.

270. [d.
271. [d. at 781.
272. [d. (citing Rule 608(b) as prohibiting a character witness from testifying on
direct examination to specific instances of the principal witness's conduct
for the purpose of supporting the principal's credibility).
273. [d. at 782-83 (emphasizing that Phillips was central to the government's
case, and, therefore, improper bolstering of Phillips' testimony could have
been quite prejudicial to the defendant).
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IV.

UNDERMINING THE EFFICACY OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE:
WHEN DOES A REASONABLE BASIS BECOME A SPECIFIC
INSTANCE OF CONDUCT?

A.

The Importance of Distinguishing Reasonable Basis from Specific Instances of Conduct

The dangers underlying character evidence are most apparent
when a character witness testifies about specific instances of a principal witness's conduct. 274 When determining if a reasonable basis exists, the court must then distinguish admissible testimony constituting
a reasonable basis from inadmissible testimony of specific instances of
conduct. 275
Recently, both the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Jensen, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Murray, have
been challenged by this distinction. 276 In both Jensen and Murray, the
sponsor of a character witness argued that the jury was unable to appreciate or properly weigh the opinion of the character witness without hearing a basis for the opinion, and therefore, the character
witness should be entitled to give testimony beyond a mere
opinion. 277
274. For general damages see supra Part lILA and accompanying text. For the
proliferation of dangers when evidence take the form of specific instapces
of conduct, see supra note 125 and accompanying text. As a result of the
fear of permitting specific instances of conduct as a method of proof, it has
been suggested that there be a total ban on the use of specific instances of
conduct to prove credibility of a witness; therefore, testimony of specific
instances of conduct should be inadmissible on both direct and cross examination. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 461 (2d
ed. 19S6); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 4S, at IS2 (recommending
"a blanket prohibition upon cross-examination as to specific acts of the
principal witness"). Some jurisdictions have responded to this fear by drafting rules of evidence that expressly exclude specific acts of conduct as a
method of proof. See supra note 58-59 and accompanying text.
275. See GRAHAM, supra note 274, § 60S.3 n.5 (1999 Supp.) ("Sometimes the line
between properly establishing an adequate basis for character witness testimony in the form of an opinion and the improper introduction of extrinsic
evidence may be difficult to locate."); see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 7, § 60S.21, §§ 608-44 to 608-45 ("[T]his Rule [60S(b)] has also been
applied to prevent testimony about specific instances of conduct on the
direct examination of a character witness in the guise of qualifying the witness by showing the basis for his or her knowledge of the person's
character.") .
276. See United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 321 (3d Cir. 1997); Jensen v.
State, 355 Md. 692, 700, 736 A.2d 307, 31l (1999).
277. Murray, 103 F.3d at 322; Jensen, 355 Md. at 70S, 736 A.2d at 315.
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In Murray, the Third Circuit correctly determined that the reasonable basis should have been limited to: (1) the nature of the acquaintance-the principal witness was an informant for the character
witness; and (2) the extent of the acquaintance-the principal witness
had worked for the character witness on numerous occasions since
1988. 278 This distinction by the Murray court provided the jury with
more than a bare opinion, yet was properly limited to the nature and
extent of acquaintance.
.
When faced with a similar challenge in Jensen, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland concluded that the trial court erred by restricting the reasonable basis testimony to the nature and extent of acquaintance. At
trial, when the character witness was asked to give her opinion, she
had already testified to: (1) the length of acquaintance-that she
knew the principal witness for over one year; and (2) the circumstances of the acquaintance-she saw the principal witness approximately once a week and spoke to him almost daily.279 This limitation
by the trial court was not error because it was consistent with Maryland
Rule 5-608 and the federal practice.

B.

Where the Jensen Court Went Wrong

The interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable basis in Maryland diverges from the federal practice. 280 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland explained this divergence by asserting that the Maryland
practice was intended to "go beyond" the federal practice. 281 This is a
dangerous and unsupported assertion.
In 1993, Judge Chasanow, joined by Judge Bell, filed a partial dissenting opinion to the codification of the Maryland Rules of Evidence. 282 Judge Chasanow warned of the potential pitfalls resulting
from redrafting and modifying over 80% of the Federal Rules. 283 He
opined, "[a] ttempting to clarify but not change the substance of a specific Federal Rule, by rewriting the rule, may create, rather than alleviMurray, 103 F.3d at 322.
jensen, 355 Md. at 708, 736 A.2d at 315.
See supra Part III.C.2.b.
See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
MARYLAND RULES, Maryland Rules Orders, at p. 33 (Michie 2000) (Chasanow,
J., Partial Dissenting Opinion).
283. [d. Judge Chasanow observed that "[i]n disregard of the common sense
maxim, 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it,' the Rules Committee recommended,
and [the Court of Appeals of Maryland] adopted, rules patterned after the
Federal Rules, but which alter the language in over four-fifths of the Federal Rules." [d.

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
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ate, confusion."284 This statement foreshadowed the conflict present
in Jensen.
It is indisputable that the language adopted in Maryland Rule 5-608
is different from that used in Rule 608. Further analysis indicates that
the language of Maryland Rule 5-608 is unique from that used in any
other state rule on character evidence, however, the mere fact that, on
its face, Maryland Rule 5-608 is different does not justify expanding
the substance of the rule.
In Jensen, the majority of the court of appeals relied primarily on the
history of Maryland Rule 5-608 to support its holding. 285 The court
placed great weight on the Reporter's Note statement that Maryland
Rule 5-608 "goes beyond the Federal Rule somewhat by providing that
on direct examination, a character witness may give a 'reasonable basis' for testimony as to reputation or an opinion as to truthfulness of
the previous witness."286 The court interpreted the phrase "goes beyond" as an indicator that the drafters of Maryland Rule 5-608 intended to allow a reasonable basis to contain more substance than
that allowed under its federal counterpart. 287 This assertion is unsupported because the true intent of the language used in Maryland Rule
5-608 (a)(3)(B) was for clarification purposes, not substantive
purposes. 288
In a letter from the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure ("the Committee") to the court of appeals,
Judge Wilner explained three scenarios relevant to the drafting of the
Maryland Rules of Evidence. 289 First, where the current Maryland
practice and law were consistent with the federal rule and the federal
rule was unambiguous, the Committee recommended the same language as the federal rule. 290 Second, where the current Maryland
practice and law were different from the federal rule, the Committee
recommended changes consistent with Maryland practice and law. 291
Finally, where the current Maryland practice and law was consistent
with the federal rule but the federal rule was ambiguous, the Commit-

284. Id.
285. Jensen v. State, 355 Md. 692, 704-09,736 A.2d 307, 313-16 (1999).
286. Id. at 70{H)7, 736 A.2d at 314 (citing 20 MD. REG. Issue 15 pt. II at P-14 (July
23,1993».
287. Id. at 707, 736 A.2d at 315.
288. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
289. 20 MD. REG. issue 15 pt. II at P-l (July 23, 1993).
290. Id.
291. Id.
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tee recommended new language. 292 As applied to Maryland Rule 5608, the latter of these three circumstances was present. 293
The authors of Maryland Rule 5-608 codified the substance of Rule
608, but modified the style, language and organization. 294 These
modifications should not be read to broaden the substance of Rule
608. The Reporter's Note explained that, in 1988, the Maryland Rules
of Evidence Committee ("Rules Committee") conducted considerable
debate as to the meaning of Rule 608. 295 As a result of the three-year
drafting process, the Rules Committee developed a proposal that "attempts to separate the 'apples' from the 'oranges' in [Federal Rule]
608 to make explicit what is implicit in that Rule."296
There is an implicit understanding that, pursuant to Rule 608, opinion testimony is only admissible if based on a reasonable basis. Although Rule 608 is silent on this point, the Advisory Committee's
Note for Rule 608 refers to the Advisory Committee's Note for Rule
405 for guidance. 297 At the time of drafting Maryland Rule 5-608, the
federal interpretation of Rule 608(a) required a reasonable basis for
supporting opinion testimony.298 The Rules Committee drafting Maryland Rule 5-608 (a) (3)(B) was cognizant of, and made explicit, the
implicit federal practice. 299 The Commentary to Maryland Rule 5-608
also recognized that, "[s]ubsection (a) (3) (B) is consistent with the
reading that the federal courts have given to the federal rule."30o Ac292. [d. Judge Wilner wrote:
In some cases, the Committee opted for the substance of the Federal rule but found the rule, as written, to be unclear or misleading, and in those instances it adopted style changes to the Federal
rule to bring the text in closer conformity with how the courts have
construed the rule.
[d.

293. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
294. See STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACI'ICE AND PROCEDURE NOTES
(Feb. 12, 1993) (Maryland Rule 5-608 "is substantially the same as the federal statute but has been rewritten and reorganized to enhance clarity");
STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACI'ICE AND PROCEDURE NOTES Gan. 8,
1993) (Maryland Rule 5-608 "is based on the federal rule but has been totally rewritten for clarity").
295. 20 MD. REG. issue 15 pt. II at P-14 Guly 23, 1993).
296. [d. (emphasis added).
297. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
298. See supra Part III.C.l.a.
299. See 20 MD. REG. issue 15 pt. II at P-9 Guly 23, 1993) ("Typically, under [ ]
Federal Rule [405], the court makes an initial determination whether the
witness has a sufficient basis on which to have formed an opinion of the
subject'S character, in accordance with Rule 104(a).").
300. MCLAIN, supra note 6, § 2.608.3, at 148.
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cordingly, the Rules Committee was aware of and acquiesced in the
federal practice of requiring a reasonable basis to support opinion
testimony. Considering this recognition, it is troublesome that the Jensen court expanded the substance of Maryland Rule 5-608.
Prior to the codification of Maryland Rule 5-608, the Maryland practice and law permitted a character witness to give a reasonable basis
for an opinion on direct examination. 30l In Durkin v. State,302 the
court found that the admissibility of an opinion "should be limited to
the situation where the opinion was relevant and had a sufficient basis." In fact, the Maryland practice and law required a reasonable basis. 303 Subsequently, in Hemingway v. State,304 the court broadened
this practice to permit a character witness to testify to specific instances of conduct as a reasonable basis.305 The Rules Committee was
aware of these implications when codifYing the Maryland Rules of
Evidence. 306
The Jensen court erred in finding no indication that the "reasonable
basis" was to be restricted to the length and manner of acquaintance
between the character witness and principal witness. 307 When analyzing the language used in the Reporter's Note of Maryland Rule 5-608,
the court recognized that the language "goes beyond" is contradictory
with the subsequent assertion that "[ t] he Committee envisions 'reasonable basis' evidence as covering such matters as how long the witnesses have been acquainted, under what circumstances, etc.,"
because the later provision seems to mirror Rule 608. 308 The court
resolved the apparent inconsistency by ignoring the phrase "covering
such matters as" and relying on the phrase "goes beyond."309 This is
the incorrect outcome when reconciling the two phrases. Because the
301. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
302. 284 Md. 445, 453, 397 A.2d 600, 605 (1979).
303. [d. The court explained further, "it is clear from the language and legislative history of § 9-115 that the extent of the basis for the personal opinion
character testimony relates to admissibility, and not just to the weight to be
given the testimony by the trier of fact." [d.
304. 76 Md. App. 127, 543 A.2d 879 (1988).
305. [d. at 136-37, 543 A.2d at 883 (allowing specific records of a witness's violent
acts to be admissible as a basis for an opinion).
306. See 20 MD. REG. issue 15 pt. II at P-14 (July 23, 1993) (acknowledging that
the second sentence of Maryland Rule 5-608 (a) (3) is inconsistent with Hemingway); 20 MD. REG. issue 15 pt. II at P-9 (July 23, 1993) ("The Court of
Appeals of Maryland has not spoken on the question but it is unlikely that
Hemingway could survive adoption of [ ] proposed Rule [405].").
307. See Jensen v. State, 355 Md. 692, 706, 736 A.2d 307,314 (1999).
308. [d. at 708 n.6, 736 A.2d at 315 n.6.
309. [d.
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Reporter's Note does not define either what "goes beyond" means or
how far "beyond" Rule 608 is permissible, but does define the matters
covered by reasonable basis, more weight should be given to the concrete examples, namely, how long the witnesses have been acquainted
and under what circumstances.
The finding that a reasonable basis is not restricted by the length
and manner of acquaintance blatantly disregards the Maryland Reporter's Note statement that reasonable basis evidence covers such
matters as "how long the witnesses have been acquainted, under what
circumstances, etc."310 Although the term "etc." does not restrict a
reasonable basis to consist of only "how long" and "under what circumstances," the term does restrict a reasonable basis to categories
similar to the preceding phrases. 311 A canon of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis, provides that where the general term ("etc."), follows the specific terms ("how long" and "under what circumstances"),
the general is limited to the nature of the specific. This limitation,
therefore, is a restriction on the content of reasonable basis testimony.
The Rules Committee clearly intended to abandon the practice in
Hemingway,312 however, the Jensen majority relied on the allegedly
broad interpretation of section 9-115 in Durkin v. State, Kelley v. State
and Hemingway v. State. 313 Although the court properly recognized
that Maryland Rule 5-608 "unquestionably intended to modify Maryland law, in particular, Hemingway v. State . .. to the extent that specific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness were not admissible
on direct examination of a witness,"314 the court found "no indication
that the Rule intended to restrict the latitude previously given to character witnesses in testifying as to the reasons underlying their opinions."315 The cases that the Jensen majority relied upon must be
placed into context. The courts in Durkin and Kelley were interpreting
section 9-115, which had recently abrogated the common law byadmitting character evidence in the form of opinion testimony and per310. 20 MD. REG. issue 15 pt. II at P-14 (July 23, 1993).
311. Et cetra is defined and explained as "after reciting the initiatory words of a
set formula ... etc. is added ... for the sake of convenience. And other
things of like kind or purpose as compared with those immediately theretofore mentioned." BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 553 (6th ed. 1990).
312. The holding in Hemingway is irreconcilable with the codification of Maryland Rules 5-405 and 5-608. Compare Hemingway v. State, 76 Md. App. 127,
134-36, 543 A.2d 879, 882-83 (1988) with MD. R. EVID. 5-405, 5-608. See
supra note 306.
313. See jensen, 355 Md. at 701-03, 736 A.2d at 312-13; see also supra notes 229-32
and accompanying text.
314. jensen, 355 Md. at 706, 736 A.2d at 314.
315. [d.
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mitting a reasonable basis. 316 The focus of the court in those cases
was separating character testimony that was sufficient for a reasonable
basis, and admissible, from testimony that was insufficient, and inadmissible. 317 At the time of the decisions, the court was broadening
character witness testimony by admitting opinion testimony only if
supported by a sufficient reasonable basis. The courts were requiring
a reasonable basis rather than permitting a wide range of testimony.
Specifically, the Durkin court was challenged by the distinction between a narrow interpretation of section 9-115, where the reasonable
basis relates to the weight of the evidence,318 and a broad interpretation, where the reasonable basis relates to admissibility and the weight
of the evidence. 319 The legislative history of section 9-115 revealed
concern that without a reasonable basis, opinion testimony might be
too freely admitted into evidence. 32o The impetus for the amended
"adequate basis" language to section 9-115 was a desire to limit the
admissibility of opinion testimony to situations where it was relevant
and had a sufficient basis. 321 The Durkin court only addressed
whether a trial court could exclude opinion testimony for lack of a
reasonable basis; the court did not address the permissible scope of
reasonable testimony.322
In Kelley v. State,323 the issue on appeal centered upon a determination of what was sufficient for a reasonable basis. 324 The Jensen court
relied upon the assertion in Kelley that section 9-115 "permits the ad316. See Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 299, 418 A.2d 217,219 (1980) ("The starting point for our analysis is Maryland Code (1974, 1979 Cum. Supp.), § 9llS."); Durkin v. State, 284 Md. 445, 448, 397 A.2d 600, 602 (1979) ("The
issue in this case centers upon § 9-llS.").
317. See Kelley, 288 Md. at 302-03, 418 A.2d at 219; Durkin, 284 Md. at 4S3, 397
A.2d at 60S.
318. Durkin, 284 Md. at 4S2, 397 A.2d at 604. The defendant argued that section
9-llS required a character witness to give an opinion with some basis in
personal experience where the sufficiency of the basis for the opinion goes
to the weight of the evidence, not to the admissibility of the evidence. Id.
319. [d. (basing the admissibility of character evidence on the court's determination that the character witness has a proper foundation).
320. [d. at 4S3, 397 A.2d at 604-0S.
321. [d.
322. [d. at 4S4 (affirming the trial court's refusal to admit opinion testimony
based on an unclear and unproved assertion that the principal witness filed
a false police report).
323. 288 Md. 298,418 A.2d 217 (1980).
324. Kelley, 288 Md. 298, 304, 418 A.2d 217, 220 ("Since the character testimony
was based, at least, in part on the polygraph test, we conclude that its basis
was inadequate and it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to admit
it.") .
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mission of a broad range of testimony which may aid the jury in assessing the credibility of a witness."325 The remainder of the assertion in
Kelley, however, goes on to state that "such testimony must not be used
as a subterfuge to indirectly convey evidence which is otherwise inadmissible."326 The Jensen court should have relied on the second part
of the assertion. Instead, as a result of Jensen, a character witness may
do exactly what the Kelley court warned against: use reasonable basis
testimony as a "subterfuge" to testifY to the basis for the opinion.
V.

CONCLUSION

As previously discussed, the history of using character witness testimony to impeach or rehabilitate a principal witness's character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness reveals that the rules of evidence operate to limit the dangers of character evidence. 327 One such limitation
is the prohibition of character witness testimony about specific instances of a principal witness's conduct on direct examination. 328 Recently, the strictures of the prohibition have been tested and
challenged through the presentation of "reasonable basis" testimony
used to support a character witness's opinion. 329
When distinguishing between "reasonable basis" testimony and testimony constituting specific instances of conduct, the court of appeals
holding in Jensen went too far. 330 Permitting the character witness to
go beyond "how long" and "under what circumstances" the character
witness knows the principal witness creates the likelihood that the additional information takes the form of specific instances of conduct. 331
The court created a state of uncertainty by failing to define exactly the
parameters of the character witness's testimony and how far beyond
those parameters the testimony may go before it is inadmissible as spe325. Jensen v. State, 355 Md. 692, 702, 736 A.2d 307,312 (1999) (quoting Kelley
v. State, 288 Md. 298, 302, 418 A.2d 217, 219 (1980)).
326. Kelley, 288 Md. at 301,418 A.2d at 219.
327. See supra Part II & III.
328. See supra Part III.B.3.
329. See supra Part I1I.C.2.a & b.
330. Interview with Professor Lynn McLain, Professor of Law at University of
Baltimore School of Law in Baltimore, Md. (Nov. 12,1999). Professor McLain expressed concern over the Court of Appeals of Maryland's holding in
Jensen. Id. As the Special Reporter for the 1994 Maryland Rules of Evidence, Professor McLain opined that the intent of promulgating Maryland
Rule 5-608 was to avoid the admissibility of specific acts of conduct on direct examination of a character witness. Id. According to Professor McLain, Judge Chasanow's dissent more effectively captured the intended
practice of admitting character witness testimony in Maryland. Id.
331. See supra Part I1I.C.2.a.
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cific instances of conduct. 332 By allowing a character witness to give a
reasonable basis that goes beyond the length and manner of acquaintance, the Maryland practice strays from the majority.333 When given
the opportunity to address the issue again, a more restrictive approach to character witness testimony is appropriate given Maryland
Rule 5-608's history and should be adopted by the court.
Michael P. O'Day

332. See supra Part III.C.2.a.
333. See supra Part IV.B.

